Introduction
There is ample medical evidence indicating the adverse effects of tobacco consumption upon health (see Madden, 2001a , for a recent summary). Recent Government publications in Ireland have suggested the long-term goal of a "tobaccofree society". As the accompanying letter to a recent Government report stated: "…there is a common objective of seeking the most effective measures possible to dramatically reduce the level of smoking in our society and above all to prevent our children from starting to smoke" (Mooney, 2000) . It follows that identifying the factors behind the decision to smoke and the decision to quit is crucial in terms of formulating policy.
In a recent paper Madden (2001a) examined the factors influencing participation in smoking, the amount smoked and factors influencing quitting for a sample of Irish women. However, one factor absent from that work was the influence of a crucially important tool of government policy in its drive towards a tobacco-free society, the rate of taxation on tobacco and tobacco products. The data in Madden (2001a) was a single cross-section of Irish women and the absence of any variation in tax or price meant that it was impossible to infer the effect of these variables on smoking behaviour. The dataset however did include some retrospective data on the year of quitting smoking (for those women who quit) and also the number of years smoking (from which could be inferred the year of starting smoking). Using this data, and incorporating the relevant tax rate for the year in question, it is possible to construct a longitudinal data set with the tax rate as a time-varying covariate.
Given this background, this paper has two principal aims. First, it examines the effect of tobacco taxes on starting and quitting smoking, applying duration analysis to a sample of Irish women. Secondly, it explores the extent to which such a tax effect differs by educational background. 1 For duration modelling in the case of starting we use the split-population duration model of Schmidt and Witte (1989) , Douglas and Harihan (1994) and Foster and 4 Jones (2000) while for quitting we follow the approach of Tauras and Chaloupka (1999) and Foster and Jones (2000) in applying standard parametric models.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we briefly discuss some of the existing literature and in section 3 we outline a simple model of starting and quitting smoking. In section 4 we discuss our data and describe and present results from our empirical model while section 5 provides concluding comments.
Review of Literature 2
It was believed at one time that cigarette smoking and other addictive behaviour was not rational and so not suitable for conventional economic analysis (e.g. Schelling, 1984) . There is now however a substantial body of literature to testify that the demand for cigarettes clearly responds to changes in prices and other factors.
Early studies of cigarette demand employed aggregate time-series data and produced estimates of the price elasticity of demand in the region of -0.4. One disadvantage of these studies was that they were unable to distinguish between the elasticity of cigarette demand conditional upon smoking and the elasticity of participation. Later studies used the type of individual level data employed in this study. These studies are able to consider separately the effect of price on the probability of smoking and on average consumption of smokers. Furthermore, studies on the probability of smoking can be d ivided into those which view starting and quitting as binary events within a discrete choice framework and those which use duration analysis. For an example of an application of the former approach to the dataset used in this paper see Madden (2001a) . However this paper only examined a single cross-section and so could not incorporate time series variation in price or tax data. As we will see below it is possible to expand this framework and extend the binary choice framework to include the effects of taxes/prices. 3 Studies which have examined smoking initiation in a discrete choice framework have typically estimated elasticities of participation with respect to tax in the region of -0.5 to -1.0 with an apparent inverse relationship between age and smoking elasticity (for a summary see Chaloupka and Warner, 1999) . There are fewer applications of duration analysis. Douglas and Harihan (1994) use a split population model to 5 analyse starting smoking. They find no evidence of a statistically significant price effect. Douglas (1998) analysed the hazards of starting and quitting, once again using a split population model, but this time with an ordered probit, which distinguishes between those who never start smoking, those who start and quit and those who start but do not quit. The "delay" before starting and quitting are modelled using a loglogistic and Weibull specification respectively. The price of cigarettes is included as a time-varying covariate. The price of cigarettes has no significant effect upon the hazard of starting smoking but the number of years an individual smokes has an approximately unitary elasticity with respect to price. Forster and Jones (2000) analyse retrospective UK data with a split population model for starting smoking and a variety of parametric duration models for quitting. They find a tax elasticity of the age of starting smoking of +0.16 for men and +0.08 for women. The estimates of the tax elasticity of quitting are -0.6 for men and -0.46 for women. They also include a variety of specification tests and find their estimates to be quite robust. Finally, Lopez-Nicolas (2002) analyses Spanish data, once again using a split-population model, and finds elasticities of delay with respect to starting of 0.07 and elasticities of duration before quitting of -1.3 to -1.5.
One feature of the above duration studies is that, while they include measures of education or income as covariates, they do not interact such variables with the tax, thus constraining the tax/price response to be identical across the distribution of education/income. This is despite evidence from cross-section studies that such a response does differ according to socio-economic characteristics such as income and education. For example, Evans et al. (1999) note t hat in the US higher-income individuals are less responsive to tax changes than others. Townsend et al (1994) , using UK data, found that men and women in lower socio-economic groups are more responsive than are those in higher socio-economic groups to changes in the price of cigarettes and less to health publicity. Borren and Sutton (1992) find evidence of an "inverse-U" relationship in terms of price responsiveness, with a higher elasticity for middle-income men compared to lower and higher-income men. Their evidence for women, while less clearcut, appears to indicate that elasticity declines as income increases. We explicitly investigate this issue in this paper by including interaction terms which permit the effect of taxes to differ across the education spectrum.
We complete this section by briefly reviewing the existing Irish studies on tobacco consumption. A variety of models of tobacco consumption have been estimated 6 mostly using aggregate time-series data for Ireland dating from O'Riordan (1969) to Madden (1993) . 4 These studies have produced broadly comparable results with a median estimate for the price elasticity of tobacco in the region of -0.5, which is in line with results from elsewhere in the world. The use of aggregate time-series data precludes distinguishing between the effect of price on the probability of smoking and on the demand for cigarettes conditional on smoking. Conniffe (1995) remedies this to some extent by combining analysis of aggregate time-series data with data on the proportion of the total population who are smokers. He found that the proportion of the population smoking is unaffected by price (or income) but exhibits a downward trend related to health concerns. Consumption by smokers does not exhibit such a downward trend but appears to have a significant price elasticity of around -0.3.
We now turn to outline the simple model of starting and quitting smoking which underlies our analysis.
A Model of Starting and Quitting Smoking
In this section we outline a simple theoretical model which underlies our empirical approach. The model draws on the exposition of Douglas and Harihan (1994) . Suppose each individual has a concave utility function at time t
C is the level of consumption of the addictive good whose price is t P , t Y is consumption of a non-addictive numeraire good whose price is unity, t S is the stock of accumulated addiction capital and t L represents other demographic/life cycle variables which may affect utility.
The stock of addictive capital t S depreciates at rate γ but it is replenished by current consumption of the addictive good t C so that
Since the individual starts off with zero units of consumption
Assume that each individual is infinitely lived, then discounted remaining lifetime utility at time t, t V is given by
where ρ is the rate of time preference.
The lifetime budget constraint is determined by the present value of lifetime wealth t A , the present value of lifetime expenditure on the numeraire good Y and the present value of lifetime expenditure on the addictive good C at prices t P . We make the simplifying assumption that lifetime earnings are not affected by the stock of addiction. 5 The budget constraint for the individual at time t is
I is income at time i and r is the rate of interest. We can now look at the decisions to start and quit smoking. Dealing with starting first, a rational individual will begin smoking if the marginal benefit of the first cigarette exceeds its marginal
where C MB is the marginal d iscounted remaining lifetime benefit of cigarette consumption while C MC is the marginal discounted remaining lifetime cost. It seems likely that some of the variables affecting marginal cost and benefit will have a stochastic component. For example, they could both be affected by the occurrence of respiratory illnesses which would reduce the appeal of smoking or they could be influenced by the number of smokers in the potential smoker's peer group. So the above condition could be re-specified along the lines:
Thus the probability of staring smoking at time t given that an individual has not started smoking in a previous period is
. In this case the hazard function is the conditional probability that a person will smoke in period t given that he has not smoked up to and including period t-1.
The analysis of quitting is very similar, except of course that marginal cost and benefit are now conditional upon a stock of accumulated addictive capital. A person will quit in period T if the following condition holds:
reflects the stock of accumulated addictive capital up to period T and the person started smoking in period ô. Note that this assumes a single spell of smoking -we do not allow for multiple spells of smoking, not smoking, smoking again etc. Then, following the analysis above, the probability that someone will quit smoking in period T, given that they were smoking in period T-1 is
In this case ) (T H is increasing in
Data and Empirical Model
In this section we discuss our data and the empirical model adopted. Our data comes from a survey known as the Saffron Survey which was carried out in 1998 by the Centre for Health Economics at University College Dublin. The Saffron Survey's aim was to survey women's knowledge, understanding and awareness of their lifetime health needs. Much of the focus of the survey was on the issue of hormone replacement therapy 6 but other information regarding health, lifestyle choices and demographics was also collected. For our purposes in this paper the relevant questions regarding smoking were as follows: " Do you currently smoke?". People who answered "yes" to this question were then asked "For approximately how many years have you smoked?". People who replied that they did not currently smoke were asked had they ever smoked and if they answered yes to this question they too were 9 asked for approximately how many years they had smoked, and in what year they had stopped smoking. From the answers to these questions it is possible to calculate the years people started (and stopped if applicable) smoking. The great advantage of this type of information is that it is possible to examine the effect of the tax rate in each given year on the probability of starting/quitting smoking.
Before the formal a nalysis it is useful to look at some summary information on our sample. The original sample size for the Saffron survey was 1260. However, since we only have tax and price data going back as far as 1960, we have dropped all women who were aged 10 or more in 1960. We are effectively assuming that subjects were at risk of starting smoking from the age of ten. Our data suggests that this is a reasonable assumption since the number of subjects who reported starting smoking before ten was miniscule. Thus we only have women who were born after 1950, leaving us with a total sample of just over 700. Of these, about half have smoked at some stage of their lives and about 35 per cent were smoking at time of interview. In table 1 we give summary statistics (with standard errors in brackets) for a number of key variables for the various subgroups in our sample.
There is relatively little difference across the groups by age except for ex-smokers who tend to be older. As might be expected this group also tends to h ave worse health (which perhaps prompted them to quit smoking). They also show a higher proportion of married, which may reflect people giving up smoking on getting married. Probably the biggest difference across the columns is to be observed in educational attainment. 7 Of the total population (including smokers) over 60 per cent have obtained Leaving Cert or higher, but of those who have ever smoked only about 47 per cent have. This drops to about 44 per cent when we examine those people still smoking in 1998. Thus getting beyond Junior Cert appears to not only lower the chances of starting smoking, but also increases the chances of quitting if you do start to smoke.
As explained above, the Saffron survey was a cross-section survey carried out in 1998. However, we are exploiting the retrospective information which enables us to examine the impact of a time-varying covariate such as tax or price on the decision to start/quit smoking. One issue which must first be discussed in the choice of tax/price.
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The choice of such a variable is motivated by the theory of consumer demand which suggests that the quantity consumed (or in this case the decision to consume) will be influenced by a number of factors, including the consumer price (which in turn is influenced by the tax on tobacco).
The tax element in the retail price of a packet of cigarettes has two components, excise duty and value-added tax (VAT). In Ireland there is a specific and an ad valorem excise duty as well as VAT. Thus the specific excise duty is added to the producer price and the ad valorem excise duty and VAT is then applied at the appropriate rate to obtain the retail price. While the retail price is thus influenced by two tax instruments (the rate of excise duty and VAT) it is arguable that only excise duty can be regarded as a specific tax instrument to address smoking, since any increase in the rate of VAT will also cause the prices of many other goods to rise. To engineer a rise in the relative price of tobacco, a rise in excise duty is appropriate.
Unfortunately the data supplied to us by the Revenue Commissioners does not break down the tax component into excise and VAT for the period up to 1973. Thus we have taken the total tax component of the retail price and deflated it by the personal consumption deflator to arrive at a real tax on tobacco. This sidesteps the need for such a breakdown since any excise tax increase in excess of overall inflation will appear as an increase in the real tax whereas increases in VAT will also be reflected in increases in the overall price level and thus contribute less to any increase in the real tax.
We thus have a choice between using the real tax content or the consumer price as the relevant time-varying covariate. It can be argued that from the point of view of the decision which the consumer makes re starting or quitting it is the consumer price which is relevant. On the other hand, from the point of view of government it is the tax content which is the policy variable. However, from a practical point of view, the choice between them is largely irrelevant. As figure 1 below shows, the two series move pretty much in tandem and the correlation coefficient between them is 0.97.
We now turn to discuss the more formal analysis of starting and quitting, dealing with starting first.
Starting Smoking
To analyse the decisions to start/quit smoking, we employ duration analysis, with the extra proviso that when examining the decision to start smoking we employ a split population model. When modelling the decision to smoke, we include as one of our Standard duration models assume that failure will eventually take place. Thus even if the last observation for an individual is right-censored (i.e. in our case they have not started smoking by 1998) it is assumed that at some stage they will start smoking. If, say, we were trying to model the duration of a light bulb then this assumption is realistic. At some stage the light bulb will fail. But the assumption is not realistic for the case of starting smoking, since a substantial prportion of the population never smoke at any stage of their lives. In this case a split population model is appropriate
where the likelihood of each observation is weighted by the probability that the individual will ever start to smoke and so the duration analysis is applied only to those individuals predicted to start smoking.
We also estimate log-logistic duration models where the population is not split.
We estimate then for the population as a whole and also for the population of smokers only.
Before discussing the appropriate parametric duration model we first present the plot of the empirical hazard function below. This is particularly useful when choosing a parametric hazard function. We use the lifetable estimate of the hazard function (with confidence intervals as shown) and this is qualitatively very similar to the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the empirical hazard. This figure shows that the hazard increases at first and then decreases. It reaches its peak when the time period equals seven, which corresponds to age seventeen since we assume subjects are at risk of smoking from age ten. There is another local peak at age twenty-one and then a fairly sharp decrease. What this suggests is that a monotonic hazard function is not appropriate for this dataset. A hazard function which at first increases and then decreases seems most appropriate, suggesting the log-logistic model is worth trying.
For the smokers in our sample we infer the age of starting as outlined above and the duration data can be viewed as a complete spell. The sample, of course, also contains individuals who are not observed to have started smoking. A parametric duration model would interpret these individuals as incomplete spells and assume that they will eventually fail and start smoking. They are viewed as "right-censored" at the time of the survey. As explained above this does not appear reasonable when dealing with smoking and consequently Douglas and Harihan (1994) in their analysis of US data and Foster and Jones (2000) in their analysis of UK data have argued that a split population model be used. In this model duration analysis is applied only to those individuals who are predicted to eventually start smoking.
Following Foster and Jones (2000) suppose we define 1 = s for an individual who will eventually start smoking and modelling eventual failure (i.e. starting smoking) using a probit specification we have
where i z is a vector of time invariant covariates, Φ is the cumulative density function for the standard normal distribution and α is a parameter vector. Thus the probability of starting smoking at a given time t is defined conditional upon eventually starting.
Given the plot of the empirical hazard function above the most appropriate parametric duration model is the log-logistic. The probability density function (.) f and the survival function (.) S of the log-logistic distribution for those individuals who eventually start smoking are
is a vector of time variant and time-invariant covariates and γ is a scale parameter.
Then the contribution to the log-likelihood function for the split population model becomes, for individual i: 
In 14 The mechanism whereby education affects smoking behaviour is unclear. It may indicate that more educated people simply have more information regarding the effects of smoking upon health. It may also indicate that more educated people are better able to process or act upon information on regarding the health effects of smoking. Finally it may reflect the presence of a "third" variable whereby which simultaneously influences attitudes towards both education and smoking/health. Thus individuals with a low discount rate (i.e. they are more "future-oriented") will invest in both their health capital (by refraining from activities such as smoking) and their human capital. In the absence of reliable measures of such discount rates it is difficult to distinguish between these different mechanisms but it is likely that all three (and perhaps others) are at work. 8
However, in an attempt to distinguish between these influences to some degree, we include a variable which we label health knowledge. As mentioned above, the Saffron survey collected a variety of information regarding the health habits and needs of women. Owing to its concentration on hormone replacement therapy, a number of q uestions were asked regarding health knowledge in this area. As our measure of health knowledge we include a dummy variable which measures the response to the question "Have you ever heard of osteoporosis?". 9 Clearly this question refers to a dimension of health which differs from smoking, but we do not believe it is unreasonable to expect that knowledge regarding osteoporosis may be correlated with other aspects of health knowledge, including the health effects of smoking.
To allow for the possibility of a secular drift in smoking habits over time, perhaps related to increased health awareness or general public intolerance towards smoking we also include a time trend. Given that all the variation in tax rates is attributable to variation across calendar years there may be an identification problem in separating the time trend and tax effects. Following Foster and Jones (2000) we include a higher-order polynomial in time, which allows for a smooth but flexible 8 For a discussion on the relative importance of these mechanisms for the link between smoking, health and socio-economic status, see Meara (2001) . 9 While knowledge about osteoporosis may appear to be a narrow definition of health knowledge, it may be a suitable measure for our sample. Typically osteoporosis is more common amongst older women. Given that our sample are all aged 48 or less, this reduces the chances that knowledge regarding it comes from direct experience but instead comes from being generally well-informed on health issues. Also since smoking increases the risk factor for osteoporosis it may be a good proxy for health knowledge specifically related to smoking. time trend. Finally, we also include a cohort dummy, which takes on a value of one if the individual is aged 33 or less and a dummy variable for marital status.
Before discussing the results it is important to point out that while educational achievement and marital status are factors which clearly will vary over a woman's lifetime, we are not treating them as time-varying covariates in this analysis. We do not have information on age of marriage nor on age of completion of education. Thus even though a women may be classified as "married" she will not have been married for at least part of the time during which her smoking behaviour is analysed (e.g.
during her early teens). However, if education and/or marital status is correlated with some more fundamental attribute such as an individual's underlying rate of time preference then the use of "ultimate" educational/marital status is justified, to a degree at least.
Bearing in mind the evidence cited above that tax responsiveness may differ by education or socio-economic characteristics we also i nclude specifications with interaction terms which attempt to capture such an effect.
Unobserved Heterogeneity or "Frailty"
The specifications we have outlined above, plus the included covariates may still not explain all the variability in observed time to failure. The excess unexplained variability, or overdispersion, may be caused by misspecification or omitted covariates. In survival analysis this is known as "frailty" since the model is unable to explain fully why subjects with shorter time to failure are more frail than others. A frailty model attempts to measure this overdispersion by modelling it as resulting from a latent multiplicative effect on the hazard function. Thus given a hazard function ) (t h the hazard becomes ) (t h α .
Frailty may also be "shared" in the sense that the subjects in a given group may experience the same unobserved heterogeneity e.g. the group may represent a family, or, as is the case here, a single subject for which multiple episodes are observed.
Recall that in the case of frailty the hazard function becomes ) (t h α . For purposes of identifiability it is usually assumed that α is distributed with mean one and variance θ . The issue then becomes the estimation of the additional frailty variance, θ . Probably the two most common parametric choices for ) (α g , the probability density function for α, are the gamma and the inverse gaussian. While the associated hazard function for the two distributions are quite alike there is one important distinction. Suppose we have two individuals with common frailty. Conditional on the given frailty their respective hazards are proportional with, say,
Marginally however, for gamma frailties the hazard ratio
but diminishes with time so that in the limit the ratio becomes unity.
For the inverse-Gaussian once again suppose that c
However, in this case the limit of this ratio is not unity but 2 / 1 c so that the frailty effect does not diminish completely over time.
Starting Smoking: Results and Discussion
We first of all discuss the results in tables 2, the split-population model and Turning now to the duration part of the split population model, when no interaction terms between tax and education are used, the coefficient on tax is in the expected direction (i.e. positive, indicating that higher taxes delay the period before starting), but is not significant. When the interaction terms are used, the coefficient on tax alone is negative but even less well-determined that when no interactions terms are used. The interaction term with Junior Cert is statistically significant however, albeit at only the 10% level. The interaction term with Leaving Cert is similar in magnitude and very near conventional significance levels, while the interaction term with third level is smaller and insignificant. Thus tax has no significant effect on duration for the default group, followed by a positive but declining effect on duration for subsequent education groups. This appears to suggest that the tax elasticity is non-monotonic but declines with education after Junior Cert. This is partly in line with the Townsend et al. and Borren and Sutton findings but, given the significance levels of the coefficients, these results are tentative rather than conclusive.
Turning now to the duration model for smokers only in table 3, we see that in general, the coefficients are better determined. In the model without the interaction terms, the coefficient on tax is similar to that in the split population model, and this time it is statistically significant. Perhaps surprisingly, education has little or no effect. This broadly carries through to the model with interaction terms. Even though the coefficient on third level education is positive and significant, the overall effect of third level education is given by this coefficient plus the product of the coefficient on the interaction term between tax and third level education and the average value of tax. Since it is the log of tax which is used, this second term will be negative, thus offsetting to some degree the positive effect of third level education on duration.
Similarly, the effect of tax for each educational group is given by the sum of the overall coefficient for tax and the interaction coefficient. In this respect we see tentative evidence once again of an "inverse-U" effect with the greatest impact of tax upon those with Junior Cert education.
In table 4 we present evidence for the log-logistic model, this time applied to the population as a whole i.e. there are some right-censored observations. We also include the frailty models here, given that the p -values for the LR test for frailty indicates its presence. 10 For the models without interaction terms, the coefficient on tax is in the expected direction and for the model without frailty and the model with inverse gauss frailty the coefficients are significant (and similar in magnitude). The results when interaction terms are used are similar across models and once again indicate non-monotonicity but interestingly the greatest effect of tax is now seen for those with Leaving Cert rather than Junior Cert.
Summarising the results from tables 2 -4 it seems fair to say that tax does appear to have an effect on duration before quitting and that there is evidence of nonmonotonicity in its effect across education. While the results from each individual regression is tentative, the uniformity across regressions is notable.
When u sing a parametric duration model it is important to determine whether the data support the particular parametric form of the hazard function. Probably the most frequently employed method is to use the model based estimate of the cumulative hazard function to form what is known as the Cox-Snell (1968) In evaluating these plots care must be taken regarding the scale of the axes. For the case of smokers only, the residuals deviate from the 45 degree line after the estimated cumulative hazard takes a value of around 1.3 indicating a limited degree of misspecification. For the whole population this deviation is observed when the cumulative hazard is around 0.9, suggesting a greater degree of misspecification for this model.
Quitting Smoking: Results and Discussion
For the case of quitting smoking the analysis is in many ways the mirror image of the analysis reported above. In this case the transition, or "failure", is the act of quitting smoking. Thus a person who has smoked for say 10 years and then quits represents ten observations, where the duration variable increases by one each year.
Each year up to the point of quitting is regarded as right-censored and then the quitting year is the transition year. A person who say starts smoking in 1988 and has not quit by 1998 (the year of the survey) is simply treated as having ten right-censored observations. We do not employ the split-population model for quitting since it seems more reasonable to assume that from a population of smokers, all, or at least a majority of them, will quit or would eventually quit if they could be observed for long enough, than to assume that from a population of non-smokers, all will eventually start smoking. Below we show the plot of the empirical hazard function for quitting, once again using the lifetable estimate with confidence intervals. Apart from the spikes at ten and twenty years there is relatively little evidence of an increasing or decreasing hazard. This suggests that amongst parametric duration models, the exponential or Weibull might be an appropriate choice. The survival function for the exponential model (in accelerated failure time format) is:
and j x and β represent a vector of covariates and regression coefficients respectively. The corresponding functions for the Weibull model are
and j x and β are as before. Clearly the exponential model is a special case of the Weibull model,
. We also include estimates from the generalised gamma model. This is an extremely flexible model which nests both the exponential and Weibull model. Its
where I is the incomplete gamma function and σ λ − = t z ln . When 1 = κ this reduces to the Weibull distribution,
gives the exponential distribution. Table 5 gives the results for the exponential and gamma models while table 6 gives results for the Weibull model where we have also included frailty models (with the results presented in accelerated time format). 11 Note that in terms of intuition, we expect coefficients to be of opposite sign to the starting models, since here we are estimating the effect of variables on the delay before quitting. Looking at the models first of all without interaction effects, we note that in all cases the coefficient on tax 11 The null hypothesis of no frailty was not rejected for the gamma and exponential models 21 has the expected negative sign i.e. higher tax reduces the delay before quitting. The magnitude of the coefficient is also very similar across models but in no c ase is it statistically significant.
When the interaction term is included the coefficient on tax increases in absolute size and becomes statistically significant for the non-frailty specifications.
The coefficients on the interaction terms are only significant for Junior Cert for the gamma and Weibull models. Given that the interaction term for Leaving Cert lies below that for Junior Cert and third level for all specifications (even though it is not statistically significant) this is tentative evidence o f an even more complex relationship between tax elasticity and education, whereby the effect is strongest for those with the least education, next strongest for those with Leaving Cert, then third level and finally weakest for those with Junior Cert. Not only is this a more complex relationship between tax elasticity and education, it is also at odds with some of the evidence for starting which indicated the strongest tax effect for those with Junior Cert.
Since the parametric models are nested it is possible to check their validity against each other, which is carried out in table 7. In all cases of the test for ó=1 i.e.
between Weibull and exponential, the null is rejected, indicating the Weibull is to be preferred over the exponential. For the test ê=1. i.e. between gamma and Weibull, the null is rejected for the case with interaction terms, indicating a choice of gamma over
Weibull, while it is not rejected when interaction terms are not included. We also present values of the Aikake information criterion, whereby AIC=-2 log likelihood +2(c+p+1) where c is the number of model covariates and p the number of model specific ancillary parameters. The model with the lowest AIC is to be preferred. We see that in terms of AIC the exponential model has values well in excess of the gamma or Weibull, but there is very little to choose between the Weibull and gamma specifications. The estimated coefficients for these models are also quite similar in sign and magnitude. We also note that all models have a Ramsey RESET p-value in excess of 0.8.
What about the Cox-Snell residuals? Below we present Cox-Snell residual and once again for the sake of brevity we present only the residuals where the interaction terms are included (the residuals for the models without interaction terms are available on request). Casual eyeballing of these plots suggests the greatest degree of misspecification for the exponential model with relatively little to choose between the gamma and Weibull models, though perhaps the gamma model is to be marginally preferred. This is entirely consistent with the results from table 7.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper h as examined the factors influencing starting and quitting smoking for a sample of Irish women using duration analysis. The innovation in the paper is that retrospective data in the sample allows for the inclusion of the real tax on tobacco as a time-varying covariate, thus permitting analysis of the effectiveness of a major policy variable in terms of combating smoking. The inclusion of interaction terms with education also permits analysis of how the effectiveness of taxation differs according to education. The evidence presented here is mixed. In terms of starting smoking, there is evidence of an "inverse-U" effect, with the strongest effect of taxation on those with intermediate levels of education and weaker effects for those with the most and the least education. It has to be stressed however, that this evidence is relatively tentative given the calculated significance levels. There is also some evidence of misspecification in the diagnostics.
The evidence for quitting suggests an even more complex relationship between education and the effectiveness of taxation. Tax seems to be most effective in terms of encouraging quitting for those with the least education. It is also effective for those who complete second level education, less so for those who complete third level 24 education and least effective of all for those with an intermediate level of education (i.e. those who leave school at around ages 15-16).
Overall, the results in this paper are probably more suggestive than definitive in terms of the role of tobacco taxes in influencing starting and quitting. It should also be borne in mind that the results here apply only to a sample of women aged 48 or under. However, given the wealth of results from other countries and time periods regarding the effect of taxes and prices on tobacco consumption, it is clear that tobacco taxation is likely to remain a major instrument in public policy to discourage smoking. LR Test, è=0, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Table 5 : Gamma and Exponential Models for Quitting (AFT format, N=8625), S.E. in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1% AFT format, N=8625) , S.E. in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1% 
